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Abstract
This paper develops a model of interlinkage in the credit market and labor market.  A
credit-cum-labor contract provides the necessary funds to undertake an investment in
migration, given the absence of sufficient collateral.  The optimal interlinked contract
eliminates the scope for strategic default.  The result shows that the very presence of
inequality is a necessary condition for migration to take place.  This could explain the
apparent paradox of why poor households in villages where asset distribution is very
skewed are more likely to migrate than households in poorer villages with less
unequal asset distribution.
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11. Introduction
A puzzling aspect of migration in some developing countries is that the poorest
households in villages where the distribution of assets is very skewed have a greater
propensity to migrate than households in poor villages with a more equal asset
distribution (Stark and Taylor, 1989).  This paper shows that the unequal distribution
of assets is a necessary condition for migration for those households that do not have
access to formal credit markets.
The main feature of credit markets in rural areas in developing countries is the
prevalence of informal credit relationships (see Mansuri, 1997; quoted in Ray, 1998;
Bell and Srinivasan, 1985; and Bardhan and Rudra, 1978, 1980, 1981).  Informational
asymmetries, moral hazard and credit rationing are widespread.  Given the absence of
sufficient collateral, loans are seldom taken up with formal lending institutions.
Borrowers who are unable to gain credit in the formal market may decide to turn to
the informal credit market.  However, interlinking credit market transactions with
those in related markets allows the lender one method of avoiding strategic default.
By exerting some form of control over the borrower, the landlord may be more certain
of repayment.
Many opinions have been offered for the reason for interlinkage and its
effects.  Bardhan (1984) cites the absence of perfect and complete market structures
for the presence of interlinked contracts, while Bell (1988) considers interlinked
contracts as a way of reducing the lenders’ transaction costs.  Evidence suggests that
interest rates in rural areas are on average high and do vary significantly across
households and individuals (see Reserve Bank of India, 1977).  Again, the reasons for
such variability differ.  Bhaduri (1973, 1977), Rudra (1984), and Basu (1997) see the
2moneylender as a monopolist who exploits the production relations to his advantage.
Indeed, one type of interlinked contract occurs when a landlord only grants a tenancy
if the would-be tenant also borrows exclusively from him, thereby bundling all the
transactions of the tenant in the credit and labor market for his own benefit (see
Braverman and Srinivasan (1981), Braverman and Stiglitz (1982) and Mitra (1983)).
Von Pishke, Adams and Donald (1983) alternatively see the moneylender as
providing a valuable service to borrowers even if it is subject to abuse.  Ray (1998)
also sees the prevailing credit arrangements in developing countries as the result of
the interlocking of market.  Moneylenders do not necessarily set usurious rates of
interest on their loans:  quite the opposite, since interest rates are not set at an
excessive level in order not to attract too many high-risk customers, in the presence of
informational asymmetries regarding the borrowers’ risk characteristics.  Bardhan and
Udry (1999) argue that interlinking can act as a device by which the landlord is able
to enforce a non-linear pricing mechanism, and thereby to extract the entire surplus
from the credit relationship.  Bardhan and Udry acknowledge that interlinking can
serve efficiency purposes, but also maintain that it can lead to monopolistic
exploitation.
Banerji (1995) finds that interlinked contracts under adverse selection on the
type of borrowers are second best to non-interlinked contracts, and reduce investment.
By contrast, Basu, Bell and Bose (2000) show that interlinkage can be superior under
moral hazard, when the tenant has limited liability.  Chakrabarty and Chaudhury
(2001) consider the interactions between the formal and the informal sector credit
market and the impact these could have on the terms of interlinked contracts.
This paper considers an interlinked contract where the borrower may be
required to supply labor at a discounted rate as part of the repayment.  For the
3borrower, the purpose of entering a credit-cum-labor contract is to acquire the
necessary funds needed to invest in migration, where the migrant household has
insufficient assets to provide collateral.  This raises a number of specific issues.
Firstly, there is asymmetric information between the migrant household and the lender
regarding the outcome of migration.  The lender is unable to observe or to verify the
wage realized by the migrant in the destination area.  There is therefore potentially a
scope for strategic default, whereby the borrower falsely claims to be insolvent.
Secondly, there is the problem of the enforceability of the credit agreement.  Once
migration takes place, a household can sever its links with the area of origin and so it
is almost impossible for the lender to recoup the loan.
The interlinkage of credit and labor markets not only provides a feasible
solution to these problems, but also ensures that lending can actually take place in the
rural economy, despite insufficient collateral and the unverifiability of the destination
wage.  The optimal contract designed by the landlord/moneylender can require that
some members of the migrating household remain in the village of origin, and that
they supply labor at a discounted rate if the returns from migration are reported to be
insufficient to cover fully the debt repayment.  In this way, the lender ensures that the
borrower does not sever links with the village of origin.  Additionally, by requiring
that discounted labor be supplied, there is no incentive to misreport the realized
destination wage.  By the revelation principle (Mas Colell, Whinston and Green,
1995), the optimal contract will be such that the borrower will always truthfully report
the destination wage, thereby eliminating the scope for strategic default.  Moreover,
interlinkage emerges as the means through which (costly) migration becomes feasible
and allows for a more efficient inter-village allocation of labor.
4Townsend (1979) and Gale and Hellwig (1985) consider the problem of
unverifiability of returns from an investment and prove the optimality of the standard
debt contract, which involves the repayment of a fixed sum when there is no
verification of the state of nature.
The results of this paper show that interlinkage of the credit and labor market
allows for investment in migration, by resolving the issues associated with moral
hazard in the destination area.  The very underlying inequality of assets in the rural
economy allows for borrowing in order to cover the cost of migration.  Inequality in
the distribution of assets therefore constitutes a necessary condition for migration.
The heterogeneity of borrower types is captured through the customized nature
of the optimal contract, that is dependent on the lender’s expectation of the
household’s earning potential.  The interlinked contract results in an improved inter-
village allocation of labor, since borrowers can migrate to areas with higher labor
productivity.
Section 2 of this paper develops the optimal interlinked contract that solves the
strategic default problem for a two-period set-up.  Section 3 extends the model to
consider longer-term loans, and illustrates how the migration decision is affected by
the possibility to borrow on a longer horizon.  Section 4 summarizes the main results
and concludes.
2. The model
This section presents a two-period model of migration, where the periods are indexed
by t = 0, 1.  The decision-making unit is the laborer household.  The migration
5decision is made at time t = 0.  If the household chooses to migrate, it will have to
incur a cost I > 0 at time t = 0.  For simplicity, and without loss of generality, the
migration cost I is normalized to unity:  I = 1.  The household is assumed to have no
wealth and no collateral.  A potential lender therefore faces the problem of
enforceability of the credit contract.  For convenience of exposition, the labor
endowment of the household is normalized to 2 units.  When the household decides to
migrate, 1 unit of labor migrates to the area of destination and 1 unit remains in the
village of origin.  For simplicity, the household is here assumed to be risk-neutral and
its subjective rate of discount is set equal to zero.
The laborer household can only borrow from the landlord.  Repayment of the
loan takes place in period t=1.  The wage earned by the migrant in the destination
village at time t=1 is a random variable, ],[~1
DDD Www ∈ , which is not verifiable by
the lender (technically, the destination wage is unobservable) 1.  At the beginning of
period t=1 the migrant reports a destination wage Dw1ˆ , which in principle could be
different from the actual wage Dw1~ .  Since the repayment of the loan must be a
function of the reported destination wage, Dw1ˆ , it is necessary to avoid the scope for
strategic default, which can occur when the household declares a wage Dw1ˆ  that is less
than the true wage Dw1~ .  The wage in the village of origin is 
Ow0~  and 
Ow1~  at time t=0
and t=1 respectively.  The joint probability distribution function of the wages in the
village of origin and in the destination village at time t=1 is given by )~,~( 11
DO wwG ,
where ],[],[)~,~( 11
DDOODO WwWwww ×∈ , where wO>0 and wD>0.  If the reported
wage Dw1ˆ  is not large enough to cover the full repayment of the loan, then the credit
6contract with the lender/landlord may require that, as part of the repayment, the
laborer household supplies 1 unit of labor in period t=1 at the wage Ow1 , which in
general is less that the market wage: Ow1 <
Ow1~ .  The difference 
OO ww 11~ −  measures
the discount at which laborers are required to supply labor in the interlinked contract.
The lender can borrow and lend in the formal credit market at a gross rate r
(which includes the principal).  This is therefore the opportunity cost of lending to the
household.  The contract specifies a repayment to the lender at time t=1, as a function
of the reported destination wage: )ˆ( 1
Dwg .  It will be shown that the optimal contract
requires that there exists a set S of reported values of the destination wage,
],[~1
DDD Www ∈ , for which the household has to supply labor at a discounted wage
rate, Ow1 .  Let 
*
1w  denote the critical value of the reported destination wage, below
which the laborer household has to supply labor at a discounted wage.  Then
}ˆ|],[ˆ{ *111 wwwWwwS
DDDDD <≤∈= .
The optimal credit-cum-labor contract between the landlord and the laborer
must satisfy the individual rationality (or participation) constraints for both.
Moreover, by the revelation principle (Mas Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995), the
optimal contract must be designed in such a way that it is always in the interest of the
laborer to report truthfully the destination wage:  Dw1ˆ =
Dw1~ .  This is the truth-telling
constraint, also known as the incentive compatibility constraint.  The revelation
principle implies that attention can be restricted to the set of contracts that satisfy the
incentive compatibility constraint.
The individual rationality constraint for the landlord is:
                                                                                                                                           
1 Alternatively, one could think that there is a very large verification cost.
7(1) )]ˆ([ 1
DwgE  ≥ r
that is, the expected repayment to the landlord must be at least as high as the
opportunity cost of funds, as measured by the alternative return on the investment
r>1.
The individual rationality constraint for the laborer household is:
(2) ]~[2)]ˆ(~~[ 1111
ODOD wEwgwwE ≥−+
or:
(2’) ]~[)]ˆ(~[ 111
ODD wEwgwE ≥−
that is, the expected value from migration at time t=1, net of the repayment cost
)ˆ( 1
Dwg  (the left-hand side of equation (2)), must be at least as large as the expected
value from remaining in the village of origin (the right-hand side of equation (2)).
Equation (2’) implies:
(2”) ]~~[)]ˆ([ 111
ODD wwEwgE −≤
By combining (1) and (2”), a necessary condition for the existence of a contract is:
(3) 1)(  ]~~[ 11 >≥− rwwE
OD
that is, the expected excess wage in the destination area, relative to the village of
origin, must be at least as high as the opportunity cost of funds to the landlord.
Furthermore, since an optimal contract only exists when IwwE OD =>− 1]~~[ 11 ,
migration financed by interlinkage always improves the allocative efficiency of labor,
8since labor moves from a low-productivity to a high-productivity area (net of
migration costs).  There is therefore an efficiency gain in the inter-village allocation
of labor.
The incentive-compatibility (or truth-telling) constraint for the laborer is:
(4) )ˆ(~)~(~ 1111
DDDD wgwwgw −≥− DD ww 11 ~ˆ ≠∀
or, equivalently:
(4’) )~()ˆ( 11
DD wgwg ≤ DD ww 11 ~ˆ ≠∀
The following upper bound must be placed on the expected value of the excess wage
in the village of destination:
(5) DOOD wwwwE +≤− ]~~[ 11
Assumption (5) is required for the feasibility of the contract.
The total surplus to the parties from the contract is given by the difference
rwwE OD −− ]~~[ 11 .  The division of the surplus between the landlord and the household
will in general depend on their relative bargaining power.  It will be assumed that the
bargaining power rests entirely with the landlord, who will therefore appropriate the
total surplus.  The justification for this assumption is that the borrowers have to
compete for funds from the landlord, who is the only potential suppliers of funds for
migration.
9The optimal contract must therefore maximize the expected return to landlord,
consistent with the incentive compatibility constraint for laborer (4) and with the
individual rationality constraints for both parties, (1) and (2).  Proposition 1 describes
this optimal contract.
Proposition 1.
The optimal contract consists of the following repayment function:
(6)
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=
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where *1w  is the threshold reported destination wage rate below which the household
must supply labor at a discounted wage:  }ˆ|],[ˆ{ *111 wwwWwwS
DDDDD <≤∈= , and
where Ow1  is the discounted wage rate.  The threshold reported wage rate 
*
1w  is
given by:
(7) ]~~[ 11
*
1
OD wwEw −=
and the discounted wage rate Ow1  is given by:
(8) ]~~[~ˆ 11111
ODODO wwEwww −−+=
Note that, when *11ˆ ww
D < , the total repayment to the landlord according to equation
(6) consists of two components.  The first component is repayment from the migration
unit, Dw1ˆ .  The second component is the discounted labor that has to be supplied by
the household unit remained in the village of origin, )~( 11
OO ww − .  Note from equation
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(8) that, ceteris paribus, the lower the reported destination wage Dw1ˆ , the lower the
discounted wage rate Ow1 .  This is the key for understanding the incentive
compatibility of the contract.  The household has no advantage in falsely reporting a
wrong destination wage, since if it declares a lower wage in the destination area it will
be required to supply labor at a lower wage in the interlinked contract.
Proposition 1 relies on the following Lemma.
Lemma 1.
For the optimal contract described in Proposition 1,
(9) ]~~[)ˆ( 111
ODD wwEwg −=
Proofs of Lemma 1 and of Proposition 1.  See Appendix.
These results are consistent with those on debt and costly verification in the
finance literature.  Gale and Hellwig (1985) derive the standard debt contract as the
optimal debt contract when it is costly to verify the revenue of the borrower, but there
is no interlinkage of the credit with the labor market.  They establish that the optimal
contract is the standard debt contract, whereby the borrower returns a fixed amount if
it is solvent, and the creditor appropriates the borrower’s assets if the latter is
insolvent and there is bankruptcy.  Diamond (1984) obtains a similar outcome for a
debt model without interlinkage.  The lender is able to hedge its risk through
diversification, in the presence of costs of monitoring the outcome of the risky
investment project undertaken by the borrower.  The model presented in this section
represents a departure from the standard literature on debt.  The optimal contract is the
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outcome of the link between the credit market and the labor market, resulting in
improved efficiency in the inter-village allocation of labor.
An important implication of Proposition 1 is that the repayment function itself
is household-specific, contingent upon the expected wage differential ]~~[ 11
OD wwE − .
The optimal contract thus captures the cross-sectional heterogeneity across
households.  Despite the informational asymmetries associated with moral hazard
over the destination wage, the landlord is still able to design a customized credit
contract that is a function of the specific household’s earning potential.
Moreover, it is shown that inequality in the distribution of assets is a necessary
condition for the existence of an informal credit market, which is itself a necessary
condition for lending and thus for migration.  Without the presence of this inequality
there would be no opportunity to borrow the funds to undertake the migration
investment.
3. Long-term loan contracts and interlinkage
Interlinkage ensures the existence of an optimal contract.  In this section the model is
generalized to allow for a longer time horizon for the credit contract.  The role of
long-term contracts and intermediate repayments in the credit relationship can thus be
addressed.
Consider a three-period model:  t=0, 1, 2.  Households face uncertainty over
wages both in period 1 and in period 2.  Debt must be repaid in full by period t = 2.
The optimal debt contract can involve a repayment in the first period and the supply
of labor to the lender/landlord at a discounted wage rate in the first period and/or in
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the second period.  If the realized wage outcome of the destination wage in period t=1
is sufficiently large, the household will repay the entire debt in the first period.  If the
outcome in period t=1 is unsatisfactory, the migrant household might be forced to pay
an intermediate repayment and in addition to supply labor at a discounted rate.  If the
outcome of the destination wage in period t=2 is also unsatisfactory, the household
will have to supply discounted labor in the second period as well.
Chang (1990) considers a three-period debt contract, where the optimal
contract is an extension of the standard debt contract obtained by Gale and Hellwig
(1985), modified to allow for the provision of intermediate repayments.
This section develops a three-period debt contract with Interlinkage, allowing
for intermediate repayments.  The three periods are indexed by t = 0, 1, 2.  At time t =
0, the household decides whether to migrate or not.  Migration entails a cost I = 1.  In
each period, the household has a labor endowment equal to 2:  one unit of labor can
migrate, the other unit must remain in the village of origin.  The household has no
wealth and no collateral.  Migration can be only financed through a loan from the
landlord.  The two-period gross opportunity cost of fund to the lender is R > 1.  There
is uncertainty about the destination wage and about the origin wage at both time t = 1
and t = 2.  We denote the wage in the destination area by Dw1~  and 
Dw2~ , and the wage
in the area of origin by Ow1~  and 
Ow2~  at time t = 1 and t = 2 respectively.
The joint cumulative probability distribution function for Ow1~ , 
Ow2~ , 
Dw1~ , and
Dw2~ , is :)~,~,~,~( 2121
DDOO wwwwF ]1,0[],[],[ 22 →× DDOO WwWw .  The wage in the
destination area is Dw1~  and 
Dw2~ , and is unverifiable by the lender.  The migrant
household reports wages Dw1ˆ  and 
Dw2ˆ .  In general, 
Dw1ˆ ≠
Dw1~  and 
Dw2ˆ ≠
Dw2~ .  As in
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section 3, by the revelation principle, the optimal contract requires that the truth-
telling (or incentive-compatibility) constraints be satisfied.  If the destination wages
are not large enough, the contract might require that the household supplies labor in
the village of origin at the wage Ow1  in the first period and 
Ow2  in the second period.
A contract consists of a set of repayments )ˆ( 11
DwG , )ˆ,ˆ( 212
DD wwG  at times t=1
and t=2 respectively.  The individual rationality constraint for the landlord is:
(10) RwwGwGE DDD ≥+ )]ˆ,ˆ()ˆ([ 21211
Equation (10) requires that the expected the return from the repayment must be no
less than the alternative two-period return to the landlord, R.  The individual
rationality constraint for the household is:
(11) ]~~[2]~~)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ(~~[ 21212121121
OOOODDDDD wwEwwwwGwGwwE +⋅≥++−−+
which may be written as:
(11’) ]~~[)]ˆ,ˆ()ˆ(~~[ 212121121
OODDDDD wwEwwRwRwwE +≥−−+
or also:
(11”) ]~~~~[)]ˆ,ˆ()ˆ([ 212121211
OODDDDD wwwwEwwGwGE −−+≤+
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The individual rationality constraint for the household requires that the expected wage
in the destination area, net of the expected repayments, must be at least as large as the
expected wage in the area of origin.
Comparison of (10) with (11”) yields the condition:
(12) ]~~~~[ 2121
OODD wwwwE −−+  ≥ R
Contrasting equation (11”) with equation (12), the migrant household is constrained in
its demand for credit when
(13) )]ˆ,ˆ()ˆ([]~~~~[ 212112121
DDDOODD wwGwGERwwwwE +>≥−−+
In this case, the household would like to borrow (since equation (11”) is satisfied), but
the lender is unwilling to supply credit (since equation (10) is not satisfied).
From equation (12), the loan contract will lead to an increased efficiency in
the allocation of rural labor, since R > 0.  Hence, the interlinked credit contract allows
labor to migrate from low- to high-productivity areas.
Let
(14) ]~~~~[ 2121
OODD wwwwEM −−+≡
Analogously to (5) for the two-period case, the following upper bound must be placed
on the expected value of the excess wage in the village of destination:
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(15) ]~~~~[)(2 2121
OODDDO wwwwEww −−+≥+
Assumption (15) is required for the feasibility of the contract.
Proposition 2.
In the three-period model, the optimal contract between the lender and the household
takes the following form:
(i) MwD ≥1ˆ
There is full repayment at t=1, no discounted labor must be supplied:
)ˆ( 11
DwG =M
)ˆ,ˆ( 212
DD wwG =0
(ii) MwwM DD <≤− 1ˆ
There is a first installment at t=1, and a final repayment at t=2:
DD wwG 111 ˆ)ˆ( =
DDD wMwwG 1212 ˆ)ˆ,ˆ( −=
(iii) DDOD wMwwwM −<≤−− 1ˆ
Discounted labor must be supplied at time t=1, and there is a final repayment
at t=2:
)ˆ(ˆ)ˆ( 11111
OODD wwwwG −+= where Mwwww DODO −++= 111 ~ˆ
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)~(ˆ)ˆ,ˆ( 111212
OODDD wwwMwwG −−−=
(iv) ODDOD wwMwwwM −−<≤−− 1ˆ2
Discounted labor must be supplied at time t=1 at the wage rate 01 =
Ow , and
there is a final repayment at t=2:
ODD wwwG 1111 ~ˆ)ˆ( += , 01 =
Ow
ODDD wwMwwG 11212 ~ˆ)ˆ,ˆ( −−=
(v) ODDOD wwMwwwM 2ˆ22 1 −−<≤−−
Discounted labor is supplied at t=1 and t=2
ODD wwwG 1111 ~ˆ)ˆ( += , 01 =
Ow
ODDD wwMwwG 11212 ~ˆ)ˆ,ˆ( −−= if
*
22ˆ ww
D ≥
)ˆ(ˆ 222
OOD www −+= if *22ˆ ww
D <
where
OD wwMw 11
*
2
~ˆ −−=
]~ˆ[~ˆ 11222
ODODO wwMwww −−−+=
Proposition 2 relies on Lemma 2.
Lemma 2.
For the optimal contract,
(16) ]~~~~[)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ( 212121211
OODDDDD wwwwEMwwGwG −−+≡=+
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Proofs of Lemma 2 and of Proposition 2.  See Appendix.
The intuition for the optimal contract can be expressed as follows.  When the
realization of the destination wage in period 1 is large enough, the landlord will
require that the debt must be repaid in full in the first period.  No discounted labor has
to be supplied, and the migrant household can appropriate the full returns from
migration in the second period.  By contrast, if the destination wage in the first period
is not sufficiently large, the household will have to supply discounted labor to the
lender, to ensure full repayment of the loan.  If the reported destination wage in the
second period is also not sufficiently high, the household will have to supply labor at
a discounted rate in the last period as well.
4. Conclusion
Interlinkage between credit and labor can be the efficient contract, when the
destination wage is not verifiable by the lender and when the migrant household has
insufficient funds to be used as collateral.  Interlinkage of credit and labor markets
does not necessarily imply exploitation of the migrant household by the landlord:
without the interlinked contract, there would be no lending and the household would
be unable to migrate.  Hence, both the landlord and the migrant would be worse off
(or no better off) without the interlinked contract.  Inter-village migration, made
possible by interlinkage, brings about increased efficiency.
The surplus from migration is assumed to be entirely appropriated by the
landlord.  The migrant household’s utility is therefore at its reservation level, and the
18
household is indifferently off whereas the landlord is better off following migration.
This assumption can be justified on the grounds that the landlord is likely to wield a
greater bargaining power.  However this assumption is not essential for the results,
and it would be straightforward to extend the model to the case in which both the
landlord and the laborer household have some bargaining power.
The optimal contract is designed to share the expected surplus from the
migration decision.  Rural households with different observable characteristics will
have a different expected surplus from migration.  The lender/landlord therefore
customizes the credit-cum-labor contract for each potential migrant household.
It is precisely because the income distribution in the village of origin is highly
uneven that interlinked contracts can be drawn up, and this explains why the
propensity to migrate amongst the very poor tends to be greater in such villages (see
Stark, 1984).  Poor households can borrow from the relatively wealthy landlords in
order to finance their migration decision.  In villages where everybody is poor there is
no possibility of an interlinked contract.  Given the unverifiability of the destination
wage, only those households with sufficient collateralisable assets can afford to
borrow from moneylenders to finance their migration decision.  The model explains
the apparent paradox of why extremely needy rural households are unable to migrate
away from their poverty.
19
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1.
Consider first the case *11ˆ ww
D ≥ .  From equation (6), ]~~[)ˆ( 111
ODD wwEwg −= .
Consider next *11ˆ ww
D < .  From equations (6) and (8),
)~(ˆ)ˆ( 1111
OODD wwwwg −+=
]~~[~ˆ~ˆ 111111
ODODOD wwEwwww −+−−+=
]~~[ 11
OD wwE −=
End of proof.
Proof of Proposition 1.
The proof of optimality involves the following steps:
1. the truth-telling (or incentive-compatible) constraints for the laborer household
are satisfied;
2. the contractual repayment is always feasible;
3. the contract satisfies the individual rationality (or participation) constraints for
both the laborer household and for the landlord;
4. the expected payoff for the landlord is maximized.
Let: (a) SwD ∉1ˆ ⇔ ]~~[ˆ 11
*
11
ODD wwEww −≡≥
(b) SwD ∈1ˆ ⇔ ]~~[ˆ 11
*
11
ODD wwEww −≡<
Step 1. Truth-telling constraints for the household:  it must be shown that
)~()ˆ( 11
DD wgwg ≥ DD ww 11 ~ˆ ≠∀
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From Lemma 1, ]~~[)ˆ( 111
ODD wwEwg −=  independently of Dw1ˆ .  Hence:
(a) )ˆ(]~~[)~( 1111
DODD wgwwEwg =−= if *11~ ww
D ≥
(b) )~(~)~( 1111
OODD wwwwg −+=
]~~[~~~~ 111111
ODODOD wwEwwww −+−−+=
]~~[ 11
OD wwE −=
)ˆ( 1
Dwg= if *11~ ww
D <
The truth-telling constraint is therefore taken to be satisfied in the remainder of the
proof: Dw1ˆ  can therefore be replaced with 
Dw1~ .
Step 2. Feasibility.
It is necessary to prove that:
(i) )ˆ(~~ 111
DOD wgww ≥+
(ii) 01 ≥
Ow if *11~ ww
D <
(iii) OO ww 11 ~≤ if 
*
11
~ wwD <
Proof of (i).
DODOD wwwww >+≥+ 11 ~~
]~~[ 11
OD wwE −≥ by assumption (5)
)~( 1
Dwg= by Lemma 1
Proof of (ii).
]~~[~~ 11111
ODODO wwEwww −−+=
]~~[ 11
ODOD wwEww −−+≥
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]~~[ 11
ODD wwEw −−>
0≥ by assumption (5)
Proof of (iii).
]~~[~~ 11111
ODODO wwEwww −−+=
Ow1~≤ when 
*
11
~ wwD < ]~~[ 11
OD wwE −=
Step 3. Individual Rationality.
Consider first the Individual Rationality constraint for the landlord, equation (1).  One
obtains:
=)~( 1
Dwg ]~~[ 11
OD wwE − by Lemma 1
≥ r by (3)
Consider now the individual rationality constraint for the household, equation (2”):
]~[)]~([ 111
ODD wwEwgE −= by Lemma 1.
Step 4. The landlord’s expected return from the contract, )]~([ 1
DwgE , is maximized.
This follows from observing that the participation constraint for the laborer
requires:
]~~[)]ˆ([ 111
ODD wwEwgE −≤
and that, under the optimal contract,
]~~[)]~([ 111
ODD wwEwgE −=
by Lemma 1.
End of proof.
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Proof of Lemma 2.
(i) MMwwGwG DDD =+=+ 0)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ( 21211
(ii) MwMwwwGwG DDDDD =−+=+ 1121211 ˆˆ)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ(
(iii) MwwwMwwwwwGwG OODOODDDD =+−−+−+=+ 11111121211 ~ˆ~ˆ)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ(
(iv) MwwMwwwwGwG ODODDDD =−−++=+ 111121211 ~ˆ~ˆ)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ(
(v) If *22ˆ ww
D ≥ :
MwwMwwwwGwG ODODDDD =−−++=+ 111121211 ~ˆ~ˆ)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ(
If *22ˆ ww
D < :
OODODDDD wwwwwwwGwG 2221121211 ~ˆ~ˆ)ˆ,ˆ()ˆ( −+++=+
ODODODOD wwMwwwwww 11222211 ~ˆ~ˆ~ˆ~ˆ −−+−−+++=
= M
End of proof.
Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof follows the following steps:
1. the truth-telling (or incentive-compatible) constraints for the laborer household
are satisfied;
2. the contractual repayment is always feasible;
3. the contract satisfies the individual rationality (or participation) constraints for
both the laborer household and for the landlord;
4. the payoff for the landlord is maximized.
Step 1: Incentive compatibility.
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This follows directly from Lemma 2:
)~,~()~()ˆ,ˆ()ˆ( 2121121211
DDDDDD wwGwGMwwGwG +==+ )~,~()ˆ,ˆ( 2121
DDDD wwww ≠∀
In the rest of the proof it is therefore assumed that incentive compatibility holds.
Step 2: Feasibility.
It is necessary to prove that:
(a) )~(~~ 1111
DOD wGww ≥+
(b) MwwGwGwwww DDDODOD =+≥+++ )~,~()~(~~~~ 212112211   by Lemma 2.
(c) 01 ≥
Ow if 11~ Sw
D ∈   (i.e., discounted labor is supplied at time t=1)
(d) OO ww 11 ~≤ if 11~ Sw
D ∈
(e) 02 ≥
Ow if 221 )~,~( Sww
DD ∈   (i.e., discounted labor is supplied at time
t=2)
(f) OO ww 22 ~≤ if 221 )~,~( Sww
DD ∈
Proof of (a) (i) )~(~~~ 11111
DDOD wGMwww =≥>+
(ii) )~(~~~ 11111
DDOD wGwww =>+
(iii) )~(~~~~ 111111
DODOD wGMwwww =−+≥+
(iv) )~(~~ 1111
DOD wGww =+
(v) )~(~~ 1111
DOD wGww =+
Proof of (b) (i) Mwwwww DODOD ≥>+++ 12211 ~~~~~
(ii) Mwwwwwwww DDDDODOD ≥+≥+>+++ 1212211 ~~~~~~~
(iii) Mwwwwwwwwww DODDODODOD ≥++≥++>+++ 12112211 ~~~~~~~~
(iv) Mwwwwwww DODODOD ≥++≥+++ 2~~~~~ 12211
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(v) Mwwwwww DOODOD ≥+≥+++ 22~~~~ 2211 by (15)
Proof of (c) (iii) Mwwww DODO −++= 111 ~~
RMwww DOD ≥≥++≥ ~ by (12)
> 0
(iv),(v) 01 =
Ow
Proof of (d) (iii) Mwwww DODO −++= 111 ~~
)~(~ 11
DDD wwMw −−−=
Dw1~< since 0)~( 1 >−−
DD wwM
(iv),(v) 01 =
Ow
Proof of (e) (v) *22~ ww
D < :
)~~(~~ 112
*
22
ODOO wwMwww −−−+=
ODOOD wwMwwwM 11211 ~~~~~ ++−+−−=
Ow2~=
> 0
Proof of (f) (v) *22~ ww
D < :
OO ww 22 ~= from the proof of (e) (v)
Ow2~≤
Step 3. Individual rationality.
Landlord:  it is necessary to prove that equation (10) holds.
MwwGwGE DDD =+ )]~,~()~([ 21211 by Lemma 2
R≥ by (12)
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Household:  it is necessary to prove that equation (11”) holds.  This follows
immediately from Lemma 2.
Step 4. The expected payoff to the landlord is maximized.
From (11”), it must be
MwwGwGE DDD ≤+ )]~,~()~([ 21211
From Lemma 2,
MwwGwGE DDD =+ )]~,~()~([ 21211
End of proof.
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